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Introduction
From mid-June to early July of 2015, the Chinese Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index (SSECI) plunged by 32%, wiping out more than 18 trillion Yuan in share value from its June 12 peak. 1 The value lost was equivalent to about 30% of China's GDP in 2014 and about 20% of the US GDP in 2014. The Shenzhen market, which has more tech companies and is often compared to the US Nasdaq index, was down 41% over the same period.
This large stock market crash produced widespread panic and pushed the Chinese government to implement a range of rescue policies. In addition to halting IPOs, restricting short selling, and restricting share sales by large shareholders, the Chinese government directly or indirectly participated in stock market trading. In particular, China Securities Finance Corporation Limited (CSF) lent money to 21 brokerages for them to buy stocks in the stock markets.
Moreover, the CSF and China Central Huijin Investment Limited (CCH), the so called national team, also directly purchased stocks of more than 1,000 …rms starting from July 6, 2015.
In this paper we study the following questions: Did the government intervention create value or was it simply a redistribution of value from taxpayers to the rescued …rms. If it created value, where did the value added come from?
To answer these questions, we estimate the costs and bene…ts of the government's purchases of stocks during the period from July 1 to September 30. We focus on the national team instead of the brokerages due to data availability. The national team continually purchased stocks starting from July 6, but we do not observe its daily trading behavior. We can only observe the national team's share holdings of the rescued …rms from their quarterly balance sheets. From the balance sheets in the second and third quarters of 2015, we can infer the net purchases by the government in that period.
Given the global turbulence in …nancial markets during the period from July 1 to September 30, it is impossible to estimate the systemic e¤ects of the government intervention. However, it is possible to estimate its e¤ects on the rescued …rms. To compute the intervention's e¤ects on the value of these …rms, we do not limit ourselves to the changes in the value of common stocks, but we study the changes in the entire enterprise value by also studying changes in the value of existing debt.
We use the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to compute the e¤ects on equity value and use the Merton (1974) model to compute debt value. We …nd that the abnormal variation in the 1 Based on the exchange rate of June 30 2015 (RMB 6.11 per dollar), there is a roughly 3 trillion dollar lost. 1 market value of common equity is RMB 113 billion. To separate the e¤ect of the government purchase from that of other events occurring at the same time, we control for the change in debt value of not rescued …rms. This di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach gives the estimate of the total increase in debt value due to the government purchase. We …nd that the increase is RMB 3,169 billion. Adding up the increase in equity value and debt value, we obtain that the enterprise value of the rescued …rms increased by RMB 3,282 billion.
This increase might come at a cost to the taxpayers. To estimate this cost, we compute the di¤erence between the purchasing value and the holding value on September 30, 2015. Since the government continually purchased stocks during the period between July 6 and September 30 and since we do not observe its daily trading behavior in the data, we estimate its purchasing cost by computing the product of the government's net share holdings of rescued …rms and the estimated purchase price. We consider three estimates of the purchase price using the average price, the highest price and the lowest price between July 6 and September 30. We …nd that the corresponding actual costs are 321.9 billion, 818.6 billion, and -119.8 billion, respectively.
Subtracting these costs, we obtain that the value created by the government purchases is RMB 2,960, 2,464, and 3,402 billion, respectively. This value is between 10% and 12% of the market capitalization of the China's stock market on June 30, 2015, and is about 10% of China's GDP in 2014.
Where did this created value come from? What issues did the government purchase help to resolve? To answer these questions, we study the cross section of more than 1,000 rescued …rms.
We …nd that the value creation came from three major sources. First, the government purchase increased the demand for shares and raised equity value and …rm value and debt value. Second, the government purchase reduced default probabilities of rescued …rms. Third, the government purchase raised liquidity of rescued …rms. We compute default probabilities using the Merton model and measure liquidity using the Amihud index. We regress changes in …rm value, changes in default probabilities, and changes in liquidity between June 30 and September 30, 2015 on the shares purchased by the government by including a number of control variables. We …nd that the coe¢ cients are signi…cant and have the right signs.
Our paper contributes to the literature by providing the …rst analysis of the costs and bene…ts of the government purchase during China's stock market crash in the summer of 2015.
Our paper is related to Veronesi and Zingales (2010) who analyze the costs and bene…ts of the US government intervention (Paulson's plan) during the …nancial crisis of 2008. Our analysis is 2 di¤erent from theirs in that the nature of the intervention in the two countries is di¤erent. The Chinese government directly purchased shares of more than 1000 …rms, while the US government provided $125 billion preferred equity infusion in the nine largest US commercial banks joined by a three-year government guarantee on new unsecured bank debt issues. Our methodology is similar, but di¤erent from theirs. Veronesi and Zingales (2010) use the credit default swap rates to estimate debt value and default probabilities. But data of these rates are not available in China. Instead, we use the Merton model to estimate debt value and default probabilities.
Importantly, since the Chinese government purchased shares of more than 1,000 …rms, we can conduct cross-sectional regressions to analyze the e¤ects of the government purchase. But Veronesi and Zingales (2010) do not conduct a cross-sectional regression analysis because they have a very small sample size.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the Chinese stock market crash in the summer of 2015 and the government intervention. Section 3 provides an estimate of the costs and bene…ts of the government intervention. Section 4 studies the heterogeneous e¤ects of the government intervention by conducting a cross-sectional regression analysis. Section 5 provides a robustness analysis. Section 6 concludes. In this section we brie ‡y describe the chronology of the Chinese stock market from July 1, 2014
to September 30, 2015. Since our study focuses on the short-run e¤ects of the government's rescue plan implemented in July, we will not discuss the events happened after September 30, 2015. Figure 1 summarizes the chronology.
Insert Figure 1 Here.
Since the global …nancial crisis in 2008, the Chinese stock market was in the bear market Optimistic beliefs were prevalent in the market. Even the most important o¢ cial newspaper, People Daily, declared on April 10, 2015 that 4,000 index points were merely the start of a bull.
Fourth, margin …nancing rose rapidly. As the stock market kept rising, the demand for margin …nancing rose. Many brokerages violated the government regulation by loosening the lending standard.
The China Security Regulator Committee (CSRC) became concerned about the rapid increase in margin …nancing and started investigating brokerages in December 2014. Three major brokerages were forbidden to open new margin accounts for three months. This caused many investors to turn to fund-matching companies, which provided unregulated margin loans to traders. These companies permitted much lower entry barrier and much higher leverage. Another form of unregulated leverage was through umbrella-trusts. An umbrella-trust investor effectively obtained …nancing from the retail savers who bought "wealth-management-products" at banks. Umbrella-trust companies acted as …nancing vehicles that charged high fees by o¤er-ing larger leverage ratios than regulated brokerages.
As the banking sector was channeling money into the stock market by unregulated umbrellatrust companies, the CSRC was worried about the risk involved. The CSRC issued a very strong regulation order on June 13, 2015 that banned all security companies from providing facility for o¤-market or shadow margin lending, which was estimated to be in the range of RMB 500 to 1,600 billion. In response, the SSECI lost 13.1% between June 15 and June 19, the largest weekly loss in 2008. The market continued to drop. On June 26, the SSECI plummeted by 7.3% and 2,284 among the 2,456 publicly listed stocks fell by 10%, hitting the lower limit. Investors with leverage ratio of 10 at fund-matching companies …rst went bust. Their portfolios were liquidated, expediting the fall of stock prices. The forced liquidation spread to umbrella-trusts, which allowed a leverage ratio of 3, and then to the margin accounts in regulated brokerages, 4 which allowed a maximal leverage ratio of 2.
On June 26, PBC cut the interest rate for the fourth time by 25 basis points and the required reserve ratio by 50 basis points. The stock market brie ‡y rebounded a little. But between June 29 and July 3, 2015, the SSECI lost another 12.27% in …ve trading days. Within just three weeks, the SSECI lost 28.6%. On July 4 (Saturday), Premier Li Keqiang held a State Council
Meeting by convening 21 major brokerages, 25 mutual fund companies, and major regulators.
Right after the meeting, the 21 brokerages announced a joint RMB 120 billion purchase plan to purchase blue-chip ETFs and alleged not to sell them when the SSECI was below 4500 points.
On July 5, CSRC announced that IPOs of 28 companies would be suspended and PBC would provide …nancing for CSF. On the night of July 5, CCH announced that it had purchased ETFs in the past few days and would continue to purchase in the stock market.
On Monday, July 6, the SSECI opened up 7.8% higher than the previous close, but then declined again with only 2.41% up. More than 900 stocks, which accounted for 42% of total stocks, dropped by 10%, closed at the daily lower limit. The CSF was reported to start buying big blue-chips in the afternoon session.
On July 7, the SSECI lost 1.3% and on July 8, the SSECI lost another 5.9%, with about one third of all listed companies suspended trading and 915 of remaining stocks closed at the daily lower limit. From June 15 to Jul 8, the SSECI lost 32.1%. Retail investors lost a lot of money and the balance sheets of the brokerages and state-owned banks were in danger.
At this critical moment, the Chinese government reached a consensus on rescuing the stock market. A number of measures were taken:
PBC announced o¢ cially that it would provide liquidity to the CSF and make sure no systematic risks.
The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission required SOEs not to sell stocks.
The CCH pledged it would not sell shares.
The CSF announced it would provide RMB 260 billion margin loans to …nance stock purchases by the 21 brokerages.
The CSRC banned large shareholders with 5% of holdings or above from selling stocks in the next 6 months.
China Banking Regulatory Commission allowed more ‡exible mortgage terms of sharesecured loans.
The China Insurance Regulatory Commission relaxed insurance companies? restriction in holding stocks.
The China Financial Futures Exchanges increased the margin requirement of CSI 500 index futures further from 20% to 30%.
The CSRC and the Ministry of Public Security initiated joint investigation on rulesbreaking short-sellers and rumor makers.
On July 9 the market rebounded and the SSECI gained 5.8%. The market temporarily stabilized until August 11 when PBC unexpectedly weakened the RMB, lowering its o¢ cial exchange rate by almost 2%. Although PBC stated that it was a move toward the market determination of the exchange rate. Many interpreted that the devaluation was PBC's increasing concern of the weak economy. The stock market responded by losing 28.33% from August 12 to August 26. There were no measures that were announced to further stabilize the stock market by the Chinese government. It was widely believed that this might be due to the fact that the Chinese government was tied by intervening in the foreign exchange market.
Summary Information about Purchased Stocks
After a dramatic drop in the stock market in mid-June of 2015, the Chinese government started to purchase stocks from the …rst week of July. These interventions were conducted primarily through two central government owned investment funds, the CSF and the CCH. 2 In our sample, we …rst collect all the information of the top ten largest shareholders of all Chinese stocks, and then manually match the names of the CSF and the CCH with the list of shareholders from quarterly reports between Q2 and Q3 of 2015. We de…ne our sample to include those stocks which were purchased by the government, and match them with their balance sheets, market prices, market returns, and fundamental performance information.
We …nd that, by the end of September 2015, the CSF and the CCH together invested in 1,365 stocks in the Chinese stock market, which accounted for about 50% of the total number of stocks in the stock market. There were 494 stocks purchased by both the CSF and the CCH.
Out of the total number of invested stocks, 41% were in the Shanghai main board, 18% were in the Shenzhen market, 26% were in the Small and Medium (SME) board, and 15% were in the Growth Enterprise board (GEM) board. Only the CCH purchased stocks from the GEM and SME boards, in a total 544 …rms. Based on the market prices on September 30, 2015, the CCH and the CSF invested in more than 77% in the Shanghai main board, 14% in the Shenzhen market, 6% in the SME board, and 3% in the GEM board. More than 60% of the purchased stocks were concentrated on those stocks that accounted for more than RMB 50 billion in market capitalization. The CSF purchased more than 66% of stocks with the capitalization over RMB 50 billion, while the CCH held only 43% stocks with a similar size.
Insert Table 1A , B, C Here.
Panel A of Table 1 presents that the market capitalization of the stocks purchased by the CSF accounted for 61% of the total market capitalization in terms of the market prices on June 30, 2015. The corresponding share for the CCH is 65% and the market capitalization of all stocks purchased by both the CSF and CCH accounted for 74% of the total market capitalization.
Panel B of Table 1 reports the balance sheet information about the purchased stocks. After the government intervention, the balance sheets of the purchased stocks improved with an increasing return to assets (ROA), return to equity (ROE), and slightly decreasing leverage (debt/assets) ratio. Speci…cally, the average ROA and ROE increased from 3.01% to 4.39% and 2.87% to 4.93% respectively, while the leverage ratio remained almost unchanged at 45%.
In contrast, the average market to book (M/B) ratio declined from 5.32 to 3.55.
Panel C of Table 1 presents the industry-wise allocation at the end of September 2015.
The CSF and CCH invested more than 30% and 25% respectively in banking and non-banking stocks. The remaining investments were distributed among various industries ranging from 7% to less than 1%. In terms of the market capitalization on September 30, banking and nonbanking …nancial stocks contributed to about 25% of the total invested stocks by the SCF and CCH. This indicates that the government purchased mainly stocks in the …nancial sector.
Gains/Costs of the Government Intervention
In this section we estimate the gains or costs of the government intervention by an event study
analysis. An event study cannot measure the systemic e¤ect of the government intervention because such an e¤ect is a¤ected by many other market events taking place at the same time.
Thus we can estimate only the di¤erential impact of the government intervention on the rescued stocks compared to the rest of the market. Following Veronesi and Zingales (2010), we calculate the change in the entire …rm value between 2015Q2 and 2015Q3 by considering both equity and debt and then estimate the net gains after deducting the actual cost of the intervention.
Market Value of the Firm
Veronesi and Zingales (2010) use the credit default swap (CDS) rates data to estimate debt value and default probabilities. Since these data for Chinese stocks are not available, we have to use a di¤erent approach. As a starting point, we adopt the Merton (1974) model to estimate …rm value and default probabilities. We then compute debt value as …rm value minus equity value.
Now we brie ‡y review the Merton (1974) model. Suppose that …rm value V follows a geometric Brownian motion process
where is the expected continuously compounded return on V , V is the volatility of …rm value and W is the Wiener process. Suppose that debt is a discount bond with face value F and maturity T . If …rm value is lower than F at the maturity date, then the …rm defaults and debt holders get V , but equity holders get nothing. Thus equity can be viewed as a call option on the underlying …rm value with the strike price F and the time-to-maturity T . Its value can be derived by the Black-Scholes formula:
where E is equity value, r is the risk-free rate and N denotes the standard cumulative normal distribution function.
8 By Ito's Lemma, equity volatility satis…es
We then use the values of r, T , E, and E as input to solve for two variables V and V using two equations (2) and (3). After obtaining this solution, we can compute expected default probability under the risk-neutral measure as
where DD is often called the (risk-neutral) distance to default. Under the physical measure, we replace r with in equation (5) and obtain the (physical) expected default probability. We choose to compute the risk-neutral default probability instead of physical default probability for computation simplicity because we do not need to estimate the unknown parameter . Crosbie and Bhon (2003) and Vassalou and Xing (2004) propose a complicated iterative procedure to compute daily V and then estimate as the mean of the daily growth of V . Bharath and Shumway (2008) propose a simpler approach.
In our application we observe stock prices data and can compute equity value E on June 30
and September 30, 2015. We then take a rolling 250 day standard deviation of equity returns to estimate the volatility of equity E . We take the one-year government bond yield as the risk-free rate r. Following Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Bharath and Shumway (2008) , we use the short-term plus one half of the long-term liability of June 30 to represent the face value of debt for non-…nancial …rms. Due to the special liability structure of the …nancial …rms (banks, insuance and security …rms), we use the total book liability on June 30 as the face value of debt. Suppose that the debt has one year maturity and set T = 1 on June 30. On September 30, T becomes 3/4. Once the values for r, T , E, and E are obtained, we can compute …rm value V on June 30 and September 30 and the default probabilities on those dates.
To apply the Merton method, we need to know the previous year's information about equity value to estimate equity volatility. Some stocks lack this information due to either new listings or mergers and acquisitions. For this reason, we exclude those stocks from our sample. We then have a smaller sample of 2,650 stocks, among which 1,316 stocks are purchased by the national team and the remaining stocks are not purchased. Insert Table 2 Here.
Panel A of Table 2 shows that the CSF purchased 680 non-…nancial …rms. The value of these …rms increased by 3.8% and the increase in value was RMB 1,086 billion. The CCH purchased 1,041 non-…nancial …rms and these …rms lost value of RMB 708 billion. The loss was 2.2% of June 30 value. The CSF and the CCH both purchased 449 non-…nancial …rms. These …rms gained value of RMB 1,282 billion and the gain is 5.3%. In aggregate, the total rescued stocks lost 2.4% of …rm value worth RMB 904 billion. There were 1,329 non-…nancial stocks not purchased by either the CSF or the CCH. These …rms lost 13.5% of value worth RMB 2,352
billion.
Panel B of Table 2 presents the corresponding numbers for …nancial stocks. the CSF and the CCH purchased 40 and 38 …nancial stocks, respectively. There were 34 …nancial stocks purchased by both the CSF and the CCH. There were 5 …nancial stocks not purchased by either the CSF or the CCH. These …rms lost 19.6% of value worth RMB 246 billion.
Change in Debt Value
Next we estimate debt value by subtracting equity value from …rm value. Equity value is computed as the stock market price multiplied by the total outstanding shares or market capitalization. Table 3 presents computed equity value.
Insert Table 3 Here.
Panel A of Table 3 shows that the purchased non-…nancial stocks lost by about 30.9% of their equity value worth RMB 9,495 billion. The not-purchased stocks lost a smaller percentage of 24.8% of equity value worth RMB 3,800 billion. Panel B shows the corresponding results for …nancial stocks. The total purchased …nancial stocks lost 26.1% of equity value worth RMB 2,586 billion. By contrast, the total of not purchased stocks lost a much larger percentage of 46.9% of equity value worth RMB 231 billion.
In summary, Table 3 shows that rescued …nancial stocks lost a much smaller percentage of equity value compared to not rescue …nancial stocks, but the opposite is true for non-…nancial stocks. 
where debtn denotes debt value of all not rescued …rms in the same industry of the rescued …rm.
Since the government purchased many stocks in various industries, we have to take industry e¤ects into account. We use the industry classi…cation presented in Table 1C .
Panel A of Table 4 shows that the adjusted debt value change is about half of the raw change for all purchased non-…nancial stocks, which is RMB 4,146 billion. By contrast, Panel B shows that adjusted debt value changed increases signi…cantly, which is RMB 2,257 billion.
This means that debt value of rescued …nancial …rms bene…tted much more signi…cantly than that of rescued non-…nancial …rms. Table 3 shows that the market value of equity plummeted from June 30 to September 30, 2015 for both rescued and non-rescued …rms. This could be due to a number of market events happened in this period. To estimate the e¤ects of the government intervention, we have to control these market events. As is standard in the literature, we use the CAMP model summarized by the following equations:
Change in Equity Value
where M KT CAP is the market capitalization on June 30, 2015, the betas are estimated from daily stock prices during the period from January 1, 2014 and June 29, 2015. We use the SSECI as the market index.
Panel A of Table 5 shows that even though the raw returns dropped much more for purchased non-…nancial stocks than for not purchased non-…nancial stocks, the abnormal returns dropped much less. All abnormal returns are negative and range from 1% to 4%. By contrast, Panel B of Table 5 shows that the abnormal returns on purchased …nancial stocks are positive and are about 6% to 7%. The abnormal returns on not purchased …nancial stocks are about -47%.
This means that …nancial stocks bene…tted from the government intervention much more than non-…nancial stocks.
Insert Table 5 Here.
Combining Panels A and B shows that more than RMB 113 billion gain in equity value of total purchased stocks during the period from June 30 to September 30, 2015. Equity value of the stocks purchased by the CSF alone and the CCH alone increased by RMB 475 and 275 billion, respectively.
Actual Cost of the Stock Purchases
Both CSF and CCH bought stocks in July and August of 2015. We compute the purchasing cost using the following equation:
Cost of Stock P urchase = P urchased Shares P rice P er Share:
The information about the exact purchasing dates and the purchasing prices is not available from public sources. We can …nd the information about large shareholders and their shareholdings from a …rm's balance sheets in Q2 and Q3 of 2015. We can estimate the purchased shares of all rescued …rms as the shareholdings of the CSF and the CCH in Q3 minus their shareholdings in Q2. We use three ways to estimate the price per share: the average price between June 30
and September 30, 2015, the highest price in this period, and the lowest price in this period.
The purchasing cost is not the actual cost because both the CSF and the CCH owned the purchased stocks. We have to subtract the market value of the purchased stocks on September 30 to obtain the actual cost incurred in the period from June 30 to September 30.
Insert Table 6 Here. Table 6 shows that the total costs of stock purchases by the CSF and the CCH range from RMB 770.5 to 1,708.8 billion. The CSF purchased fewer stocks, but the purchasing costs were higher. The market value of purchased stocks by the CSF on September 30 was RMB 599.2 billion, compared to RMB 291 billion for CCH. Subtracting the market value on September 30, we obtain the total actual costs of stock purchases by both the CSF and the CCH, RMB 321.9 (average price), 818.6 (highest price), and -119.8 (lowest price). Thus if the CSF and the CCH purchased stocks at the lowest prices, they made money from capital gain in equity. But if they purchased stocks at the average or higher prices, they had a capital loss at the expense of taxpayers. Unfortunately the data on the precise purchasing prices and quantities are not available from public sources. Thus we do not know whether the government received capital gains from equity between September 30 and June 30, 2015.
Net Gains of the Government Purchase Plan
We are ready to compute the net costs and bene…ts of the stock purchase plan using the following equation:
N et gains = Adjusted change in debt value + Change in equity value Actual cost.
Plugging the estimates obtained in Tables 4, 5 , and 6, we obtain the net gains for …nancial and non-…nancial …rms in Table 7 . From the two panels, we observe the following: (1) Both purchased …nancial stocks and non-…nancial stocks bene…tted by about RMB 3,000 billion. (2) The net gains came mostly from the adjusted increase in debt value. (3) The net gains of both …nancial and non-…nancial stocks purchased by the CSF were larger than purchased by the CCH.
Insert Tables 7 and 8 Here. Insert Figure 2 Here.
Sources of Value Creation
In the previous section we have shown that the government purchase plan created a substantial amount of value. This section addresses the following questions: What kind of …rms was more likely to be saved? Where did the value creation come from? Since the government purchased shares of more than 1000 …rms, we have a fairly large sample for a cross-sectional regression analysis. We begin by examining all stocks in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges using
Wind and CSMAR …nancial statement data matched with the stock purchase information by the CSF and the CCH. We exclude …nancial …rms and newly listed …rms from the sample in our regression analysis.
Insert Table 9 Here. Table 9 describes the main variables in our regression analysis including …rm value, debt value, default probability, return on assets (ROA), market-to-book ratio (M/B), leverage, cash ‡ow, and dividend ratio. Following the recent study by Brogaard et al. (2016) , we construct the Amihud index, a measure of illiquidity. In our summary statistics, we also include dummy variables SOE (which equals 1 if the actual controller of a company is a state-owned enterprise, otherwise 0), export (which equals 1 if a company had foreign sales in 2015Q1, otherwise 0) and blue chip (which equals 1 if a company is a blue chip, otherwise 0).
Panel B of Table 9 reports summary statistics of the variables between June 30 and September 2015. There are several extreme values among the observations in the sample. Too exclude outliers, we winsorize both the top and bottom 1% for our empirical analysis. Overall, we have more than 2,500 observations in the regression analysis. The main regression results of this paper are based on the balance sheet information at 2015Q2. As a robustness in section 5, we will use the balance sheet information from 2015Q3.
What Kind of Firms was More Likely to Be Saved?
As Table 1 shows, the government purchased many …rms with various characteristics in various industries. What kind of …rms was more likely to be saved? To answer this question, we study 14 a Probit model speci…ed below:
where the vector X includes variables related to …rm characteristics, ownership dummy, and export dummy. The reason we add export dummy is that during the period under consideration,
China experienced a devaluation of its currency, RMB. This may a¤ect the market value of exporting …rms signi…cantly.
Insert Table 10 Here.
We present the regression results in Table 10 . As seen in columns 1 to 4, there is a very strong and signi…cant positive correlation between the probability of being purchased by the government and …rm characteristics including ROA, market-to-book ratio, dividend ratio, SOE dummy, and blue-chip dummy. These results hold true both with and without industry …xed e¤ects speci…cations. Moreover, the higher the ROA or the higher the dividend ratio, the more likely a …rm is included in the government purchase plan. Being a SOE or a blue-chip …rm also increases the likelihood of being included in the government purchase plan. A …rm with a larger market-to-book ratio is less likely to be included in the government purchase plan. These regression results indicate that the government is more likely to purchase value stocks, blue-chip stocks, high-dividend-yield stocks, and stocks of pro…table …rms or SOEs. Interestingly, there is no statistical relationship between the export status and the probability of being purchased by the government. This result is consistent with the o¢ cial announcements that the government did not intervene the stock market in response to the currency devaluation in August 2015.
Did Purchasing More Shares Create More Values?
Intuitively, if the government purchases more stocks, it will raise more demand for stocks and hence raise more equity value, …rm value, and debt value. Tables 3 and 5 show that although equity value fell signi…cantly during the period from June 30 to September 30, 2015, the fall would be more signi…cant without the government purchase. To examine whether value creation would be higher if the government purchased more stocks, we run the following cross-sectional regression: We …nd a signi…cant positive relationship between the number of shares purchased by the government and value creation, after including many control variables. This result holds true for various speci…cations considered in columns 1 through 5 and in columns 6 through 10.
Moreover, ROA, dividend yield, and leverage as well as the blue-chip, and export dummies have a positive correlation with the value creation. But M/B is negatively related to the value creation. This indicates that fundamentals matter for value creation.
When we gradually add more control variables from columns 1 to 5 for the regressions on …rm value growth, the slope of GOV gradually decreases, but is still signi…cant, and R-squared gradually increases. A similar result holds true for the regressions on debt value growth. In columns 5 and 10 we …nd that the slope of GOV is 0.009 and 0.155, respectively, when we include all control variables. The interpretation based on our de…nition of GOV in Table 9 is that a one percentage point increase in the ratio of the number of shares purchased by the government to the total outstanding shares will raise …rm value by 0.9% and debt value by 15.5%.
Insert Table 11 Here.
The positive and signi…cant relationship between government intervention and value creation documented above is consistent with the aggregate evidence of the government purchase plan reported in Section 3.
The Impact on Default Probabilities and Liquidity
In this previous section we have shown that if the government purchased more shares, it would create more values. This could be due to the abnormal returns of equity generated by the increased demand for stocks. In this section we examine two additional channels: reduced default probabilities and increased liquidity.
As shown in section 3, we can compute the expected default probabilities using the Merton (1974) model. We then compute the change in default probabilities between June 30 and September 30, 2015 for each stock. We use the Amihud index to describe illiquidity for each stock. We then run the following cross-sectional regressions:
a n X n + ": Table 12 reports the regression results. Columns 1 to 5 of Table 12 show that there is a signi…cant negative relationship between the change in default probabilities and the number of shares purchased by the government across various speci…cations. This implies that an increase in the number of shares purchased by the government tends to reduce the stock's default probability. The slope of GOV varies from -0.004 to -0.007 with di¤erent control variables. In column 5 the slope of GOV is -0.006 when we include all control variables. The interpretation is that a one percentage increase in the ratio of the number of shares purchased by the government to the total outstanding shares will reduce the default probabilities by 0.6%.
Insert Table 12 Here.
In columns 6 through 10, we …nd that there is a signi…cant negative relationship between the Amihud index, our proxy for illiquidity, and GOV across various speci…cations. This implies that an increase in the number of shares purchased by the government relative to total outstanding shares tends to increase the liquidity of stocks.
Robustness

Alternative Control Variables
In the regressions reported in Tables 10 to 12 , we use …rm characteristics collected from the balance sheets in 2015Q2 as the control variables. As a robustness check, we now consider the balance sheet variables in 2015Q3 as the new control variables. Tables 13 and 14 report the results. We …nd that our result, that value creation is positively related to GOV, is robust to using alternative measures of control variables. The magnitudes of the slope of GOV are similar, except that the slope of GOV is 0.018 in column 5 of Table 13, while it is 0.009 in column 5 of Table 11 . This di¤erence might be due to the relatively small sample in our cross-sectional regressions.
Insert Table 13 Here. Table 14 shows that the negative relationship between GOV and default probabilities and the positive relationship between GOV and liquidity are robust to alternative measures of control variables. Moreover the slope of GOV is signi…cant across various speci…cations and the magnitudes of the slope are quite similar in Tables 12 and 14 .
Insert Table 14 Here
The Government Purchase Dummy
In the previous section we have studied the impact of the number of shares purchased by the government on value creation, default probabilities, and liquidity. We …nd that if the government purchases more shares, then the value creation will be higher, the default probabilities will be lower, and the liquidity will be higher. Now we ask whether the government purchase plan indeed raised liquidity and reduced default probabilities relative to the stocks not purchased by the government. We use the government purchase dummy (GOVD) as a regressor to study this question. Table 15 reports the results.
Insert Table 15 Here. Table 15 shows that the slopes of GOVD are negative and signi…cant for both regressions on default probabilities and illiquidity across various speci…cations. Overall, we conclude that there is a positive e¤ect of the government intervention plan on the liquidity and default probabilities of the stock.
Conclusions
In this paper we have estimated the bene…ts and costs of the government purchase plan. We …nd that the plan increased the value of the rescued …rms with a total net bene…t between RMB 5,697 and 6,635 billion, which is about 10% of the Chinese GDP in 2014. The value creation came from the increased stock demand by the government, the reduced default probabilities, and the increased liquidity.
Our estimated value creation is based on an event study and the identi…cation of the sources of value creation is based on a cross-sectional regression analysis. It would be interesting to use the di¤erence-in-di¤erence methodology to study the heterogeneous e¤ects of the government purchase plan. We have not conducted such an analysis because of the data limitation. We leave such a study for future research. Panels A and B report equity value for non-financial and financial stocks respectively. Equity value is equal to market capitalization computed as the market price multiplied by the number of outstanding shares. Panels A and B report estimated debt value for non-financial and financial stocks respectively. Debt value is equal to firm value minus equity value from Tables 2 and 3 . "Adjusted debt value change" is equal to the industry aggregate of the estimated debt value change of purchased stocks, adjusted for the debt value change of not purchased stocks in the same industry. 
of Common Equity of Purchased Stocks
Panel A reports the non-financial stocks' information, while Panel B reports the financial stocks' information. The market capitalization is the price per share on 06/30/2015 multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. The estimated beta is based on the average daily return between 01/01/2014 and 06/29/2015. The abnormal return equals raw return -estimated beta multiplied by the market return. "Equity value gain" is the product of the market capitalization (June 30) multiplied by the abnormal return. The cost of stock purchase is equal to the purchased shares multiplied by the estimated purchase prices. The average, highest, and lowest costs of stock purchase are based on the average, highest, lowest prices of common equity between 06/30/2015 and 09/30/2015. "Market value of shareholdings by government" is the value of the shareholdings of the government purchased stocks on 09/30/2015. The "actual cost of stock purchase" is the difference between the cost of stock purchase and the market value of shareholdings by the government. Panel A reports the non-financial stocks' net gains, while Panel B reports the financial stocks' net gains. The value gain of the debt equals to the adjusted debt value change, which comes from Table 4 . The value gain of common equity comes from Table 5 . The actual cost of the government purchase plan comes from Table 6 . The net gain is the sum of the value gains from common equity and adjusted debt value minus actual costs. This table presents the linear Probit choice model to estimate the factors determining the government purchase plan, which includes firm and industry characteristics. All variables are defined in Table 9 . All firm level variables are based on the balance sheet information at Q2 2015. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
(1) (2) (3) This table presents the regressions to estimate the correlation between the government purchase plan and value creation, which includes firm and industry characteristics. All variables are defined in This table presents the regressions to estimate the impact of the government purchase plans on default probability change and liquidity separately, which includes firm and industry characteristics. All variables are defined in This table presents the regressions to estimate the impact of the government purchase plan on value creation. All variables are defined in Table 9 . All firm-level variables are based on the balance sheet information in 2015Q3. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0. This table presents the regressions to estimate the impact of the government purchase plans on default probability change and liquidity separately, which includes firm and industry characteristics. All variables are defined in This table presents the regressions to estimate the impact of the government purchase plans on default probability change and liquidity separately, which includes firm and industry characteristics. All variables are defined in 
